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THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY AND THE OLD
CONSTITUTION: THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
John C. Yoo*
A noted scholar on foreign affairs law has declared, " [n ]o
provision in any treaty has been held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court and few have been seriously challenged there." 1
The Constitution appears to subject treaties and executive
agreements to the same limitations that apply to all other actions of the federal government. 2 Further, the first principles of
constitutionalism seem to dictate that the federal government
cannot evade the Constitution simply because it acts through the
process of presidential ratification and senatorial consent, rather
than through bicameralism and presentment. 3 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court's record on foreign relations is littered with
cases in which the Court arguably stretched the law in order to
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the manuscript, and Dick Buxbaum, Susan Davies, Mike Glennon, Stephen Higgins,
Mike Hirshland, Laurent Mayali, Sai Prakash, and Ron Rotunda, for helpful discussions.
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1. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 7 (Foundation Press, 1972).
Events of the last 25 years have not changed the truth of this observation. See Louis
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 185 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 1996).
2. See Reid v. Coven, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitution bars court martial of civilian spouses who murdered servicemen-husbands).
3. As Justice Black wrote "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power
on the Congress, or on any other branch of government, which is free from the restraints
of the Constitution ... The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all
branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or
by the Executive and the Senate combined." Id. at 16-17.
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find that an international agreement did not violate a structural
provision of the Constitution. 4
Last year's ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC") 5 presents this same tension between the requirements of the structural Constitution and the demands of the nation's international obligations. The Convention bans not only
the current use and possession of chemical weapons, but also research, development, and production of such arms in the future.
Because of the dual civilian and military uses of several potentially banned chemicals, verification procedures have become
the critical issue for the success of the treaty. To enforce the
prohibition on chemical weapons now and in the future, the
Convention imposes the most intrusive verification procedures
yet seen in a multilateral arms control agreement. In particular,
the ewe establishes a new international organization that will
enjoy the power to conduct snap inspections on almost any military or civilian site within a state party's territory.
Implementation of this treaty scheme will face difficult
challenges due to the Constitution's checks on the power of the
federal government and its guarantees for the individual rights
of the citizenry. Others have identified the constitutional problem raised by the CWC's provisions for warrantless searches of
American industrial and business sites. 6 This Essay will focus on
a deeper structural issue: whether the Constitution-in particular, the Appointments Clause-permits individuals who are not

4. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (migratory bird treaty does
not violate state sovereignty and Tenth Amendment); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) (executive agreement suspending and transferring American claims
against Iran authorized by Congress, even though International Emergency Economic
Powers Act failed to provide authority).
5. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 21, 103d Cong.,1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 321.L.M. 800 (1993) ("CWC").
6. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Political and
Constitutional Issues, 15 Const. Comm. 131 (1998); David G. Gray, Note, "Then the
Dogs Died": The Fourth Amendment and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 567 (1994); David A. Koplow, The Shadow and Substance of
Law: How the United States Constitution Will Affect the Implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson, eds., Shadows and Substance:
The Chemical Weapons Convention 155-79 (Westview Press, 1993); Edward A.
Tanzman, Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the
United States, 13 Yale J. Inti. L. 21 (1988); David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection:
Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
229 (1988). As with so many of the issues involving foreign affairs and the Constitution,
many of these problems were identified long ago by Louis Henkin. Louis Henkin, Arms
Control and Inspection in American Law 255 (Columbia U. Press, 1958).
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officers of the national government to exercise authority under
7
federal law that affects the rights of American citizens.
Long overlooked, the Appointments Clause has received
increased scrutiny of late. In several recent opinions, the Supreme Court has found that the Constitution requires that any
individual who exercises substantial government authority and
discretion must undergo appointment in accordance with the
procedures of Article II, Section 2. 8 Although one might read
the Appointments Clause, as the Court has noted, "as merely
dealing with etiquette or protocol," it is clear that "the drafters
had a less frivolous purpose in mind. " 9 This purpose was twofold: first, to prevent any single branch from manipulating federal appointments~ and second, to ensure that those making appointments would ultimately be accountable to the people of the
United States. 10 As this Essay will demonstrate, the Court's current approach to the Appointments Clause comports both with
the framers' original understanding of the Clause as a check on
national power, and with the Constitution's structural goal of
preserving democratic self-government and public accountability.
These understandings of the Appointments Clause-both
modern and historical-pose a difficult obstacle to the CWC's
verification procedures. If the President and the Senate
authorize an international organization to conduct searches on
American soil, they will have delegated public authority outside
the governmental system established by the Constitution.
Vesting such authority in officials who are not officers of the
United States risks offending both the fundamental principle of
popular sovereignty underlying our Constitution11 and the Appointment Clause's basic goal of government accountability.
The case of the CWC, however, also highlights certain ambigui7. The Appointments Clause declares that the President "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law." U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2.
8. See Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 752 (1994); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988); Bowsher. v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
9. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125.
10. See, e.g., Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring).
11. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425
(1987); Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (U. of North
Carolina Press, 1969).
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ties in the Court's approach to the Appointments Clause that
may suggest ways to conform the treaty to the Constitution.
Following this introduction, this Essay will proceed in three
parts. Part I will describe the CWC's verification procedures
and its implementing legislation, which is presently before Congress. Part II will examine the Court's case law interpreting the
Appointments Clause and the broader constitutional principles
of democratic self-government that support it. Part III will discuss ways in which the Clause applies to the CWC, and will examine possible solutions to the CWC's constitutional problems.
I

The CWC seeks to achieve the ambitious goal of eliminating chemical weapons by establishing an intrusive verification
mechanism unprecedented for a multilateral treaty. State parties undertake the primary obligation of renouncing the use, development, acquisition, or production of chemical weapons. 12
They also agree to destroy any chemical weapons and production facilities currently within their jurisdiction and control. 13
Verification is of crucial importance to the success of the
ewe because, unlike other arms control agreements, the ewe
goes beyond numerical caps on weapon stockpiles or limitations
on weapon use in warfare. Instead, the ewe seeks to impose a
complete ban on the development, production, and stockpiling
of an entire class of weapons. The ease with which chemical
weapons can be manufactured and concealed presents a difficult
challenge for any verification system. Lethal substances such as
mustard gas, for example, can be manufactured in a vat with two
common industrial chemicals. 14 Detection of prohibited facili12. ewe, Art. I, para. 1 (cited in note 5). A valuable reference work on the Convention with commentary on each provision is Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A
Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1994).
13. ewe, Art. I, para. 2, 4 (cited in note 5). Earlier efforts to regulate chemical
weapons had prohibited only their use in warfare, but not their production, storage, and
deployment. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,
26 U.S.T 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. Moreover, these earlier chemical weapons agreements had failed to establish any verification mechanisms. Earlier attempts to
control chemical weapons may have neglected to implement a verification procedure
because during the interwar period "the 'politesse' of relations between nations seemed
to require at least the pretense that they, like gentlemen, could of course be trusted to
keep their agreements." Henkin, Arms Control at 47 (cited in note 6).
14. On the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, see generally Kathleen C.
Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the
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ties is also difficult because production sites can be "dual use;"
in other words, civilian chemical plants can easily switch to the
15
production of chemical weapons, and vice-versa.
A cheating nation can conceal a chemical weapons facility
in an extremely small space. A laboratory no more than 1600
square feet in size can manufacture one hundred tons of chemical weapons in one year. 16 Successfully verifying compliance
with the CWC will require monitoring all sites that use and produce civilian chemicals, in addition to the usual military and defense contractor sites that are the subject of other arms control
agreements. 17
Additional challenges are created by the multilateral nature
of the treaty. A multilateral agreement with many parties of
disparate resources and interests will produce difficult enforcement and verification problems. Smaller nations will not have
the ability to verify compliance of the treaty by other nations,
and thus they will be forced to rel~ upon international verification organizations and methods. 1 Because the low cost of
chemical weapons make them a "poor man's atomic bomb," the
incentive for less advanced nations to cheat so as to achieve strategic parity with more developed countries is probably higher
than in a bilateral arrangement between parties of equal
strength.
In order to overcome these challenges, the Convention creates a verification mechanism that reaches not just manufacturers of chemical weapons, but also most producers and users of
industrial chemicals. According to the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment, potentiall~ 10,000 sites in the United
States qualify for CWC inspection. 9 Under the so-called challenge procedures of the Convention, potentially any facility or
location in the nation- whether involved in the chemical indus90's (V. of Illinois Press, 1991); Hugh D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons: The Technical Background (Cambridge U. Press, 1992).
15. Address by Vice President George Bush to the Conference on Disarmament:
Chemical Weapons Convention, April 18, 1984, quoted in Tanzman, 13 Yale J. Inti. L.
23 (cited in note 6).
16. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons at 19-20 (cited in note 14); Gray, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. at 575-76 (cited in note 6).
17. See Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in
Morel and Olson, eds., Shadows and Substance at 17-36 (cited in note 6).
18. Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust but Verify": The Production of Information in
Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 Cornell Inti. L.J. 1, 57
(1993).
19. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the United States Chemical Industry 15 (1993) ("OTA Study").
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try or not-might be subject to search. According to the treaty,
challenge inspections can reach "any facility or location in the
territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction" of a state
20
party. Many if not most of these factories, industrial sites, and
other locations will not be under the direct control of the United
States government, but instead will be in the hands of private
commercial enterprises and companies. 21
The Convention provides for three basic types of verification for sites that produce or store chemical weapons or designated chemicals. First, state parties are required to provide annual, detailed reports on facilities that could produce chemical
weapons. 22 Second, sites involved in the chemical industry are
subject to on-site inspections. 23 Third, any state party can demand a "challenge" inspection of any location within the juris24
diction of another party. The Convention also creates a new
international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons. 25 The Organization's Technical Secretariat will choose the targets for inspection and will conduct the
searches. 26 This discussion will focus on the legal issues posed by
the on-site and challenge searches, which allow members of the
Technical Secretariat to enter and search sites on American soil.
On-site inspections monitor facilities that produce substances that either have been used as, or could help create,
chemical weapons. Facilities are classified into four groups
based upon the potential dangerousness of the chemical produced; the intrusiveness and regularity of inspections depend on
which classification a facility receives. For example, a facility
that manufactures a "Schedule 1" substance, which has been
used as a chemical weapon in the past, is limited as to the production amount and use of the chemical and is subject to regular
on-site searches and monitoring.Z7 Schedule 2 and 3 facilities,
which receive less intrusive monitoring, produce less lethal
chemicals that still might be used to create chemical weapons. If
a facility manufactures chemicals that fall within the broader,
"Other" category, which includes many organic chemicals that
have not been used as chemical weapons in the past, it is subject
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

ewe, Art. IX (cited in note 5).
OTA Study at 19-32 (cited in note 19).
ewe. Art. VI (cited in note 5).
Id.
ewe, Verification Annex, Part X (cited in note 5).
ewe, Art. VIII (cited in note 5).
ewe. Art. VIII, Part D (cited in note 5).
ewe, Verification Annex, Part VI (cited in note 5).
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to random targeting and inspection by the Technical Secretariat.
While there may be only a few dozen Schedule 1 facilities in the
nation, Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimates
that there are more than 10,000 sites in the United States that
fall within the Other category. 28
While some details of the search procedures are left to future development, the ewe reserves broad inspection rights to
the Technical Secretariat inspection teams. Inspection teams
must be permitted to enter the state party through a designated
point of entry. 29 According to the CWC Verification Annex, the
inspection team enjoys "the right to unimpeded access to the inspection site," and the signatory nation has an obligation to
grant the team transportation and entrance to the facility to be
searched. 30 Inspection teams may interview facility personnel,
collect samples, inspect documents and records, take photographs, and bring testing equipment into the facility. Government personnel of the state party may not impede the inspection, although they may observe certain searches.
Of course, on-site inspections and continuous monitoring
will only deter treaty violations at known chemical facilities. In
cases where a nation is suspected of operating a hidden or undeclared weapons facility, the ewe relies upon challenge inspections to enforce its terms. Each state party has the right to demand an on-site inspection of any location within the
jurisdiction of another party. "Without delay," the inspected nation is to provide the search team with unimpeded access to the
facility in question and is required to allow a representative of
the challenging nation to observe the inspection.31 The search
itself is to be conducted "in the least intrusive manner possible,"
and its purpose is solely to determine "facts relating to possible
non-compliance. " 32 The Convention sets no numerical limits on
the number of challenge searches that one nation may demand
of another .33
28. OTA Study at 15 (cited in note 19).
29. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II (cited in note 5). The Secretariat must notify the state concerning the site to be searched and the type of inspection. I d.
30. ld.
31. CWC, Art. IX (cited in note 5).
32. ld.
33. The Convention attempts to provide some procedural safeguards to prevent
abuse of challenge inspections. A state may demand a challenge inspection "for the sole
purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance
with the provisions of' the Convention, it must keep the inspection "within the scope" of
the Convention, and it must provide information to support its inspection demand.
ewe, Art. IX (cited in note 5). The challenging nation must provide its reasons for the
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A nation undergoing a challenge search is permitted to take
measures to protect "sensitive installations" and to prevent disclosure of "confidential information and data, not related" to
the Convention. 34 Furthermore, the Convention contains a provision that a state party's obligation to provide access in response to a challenge is "to take into account any constitutional
obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or
searches and seizures." 35 Apparently, this provision allows a
state party to raise a warrant requirement or a potential takings
claim as a ground for seeking modification to a challenge inspection.36 But this is by no means clear, nor is it obvious how the
provision would operate. Further, the Convention declares that
an inspected state cannot use constitutional obligations "to conceal evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under" the Convention. 37
Implementing legislation proposed in Congress guarantees
that ewe officials will have full access to inspection sites, and it
places some reasonable limitations on the scope of the searches.
Not yet passed by Congress, the legislation authorizes the Technical Secretariat to conduct inspections of U.S. facilities, with
American officials along as company. Under the bill it is illegal
"for any person to fail or refuse to permit entry or ins~ection, or
to disrupt, delay or otherwise impede an inspection." 8 Federal
courts are authorized to restrain violations and to compel compliance with the Convention and its implementing legislation. A
search warrant process is established for challenge searches, but
not for the on-site inspections of identified facilities (i.e. Sched-

demand to the Executive Council of the Convention, which can block a challenge request by a three-quarters majority vote. ewe, Verification Annex, Part IX (cited in
note 5). The Council, however, can reject the request only if it considers the inspection
demand to be "frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the scope" of the Convention.
CWC, Art. IX (cited in note 5).
34. ewe, Art. IX (cited in note 5).
35. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X (cited in note 5).
36. Gray, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 590 (cited in note 6).
37. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X (cited in note 5).
38. H.R. 1590, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1997); see also S. 610, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 306 (1997). H.R. 1590 parallels the ewe implementing legislation introduced,
but not passed, in the 104th Cong. See S. 1732, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). S. 610,
which passed the Senate on May 23, 1997, 143 Cong. Rec. S5080, differs in some significant respects from H.R. 1590. S. 610, for example, requires that the United States seek
facility agreements for all schedule 2 and 3 facilities, that the government seek consent
before a search, and that the government receive an administrative search warrant before an inspection should the consent not be given. S. 610 also appears to make international inspectors liable for illegal disclosure of confidential information.
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ule 1 through Other sites). 39 These latter searches, however,
must "be commenced and completed with reasonable promptness and shall be conducted at reasonable times, within reasonable limits, and in a reasonable manner." 40 Inspections may extend to anything within the premises that is "related to" the
requirements of the Convention, but the bill protects certain
41
proprietary information and trade secrets from inspection.
Several elements of the verification regime are worth noting at this stage. First, the inspections are conducted by officials
of the Technical Secretariat, not by American officials. Members of the Secretariat choose the sites to be inspected, according to standards that they develop. There is no provision for review of a decision to search by any American official, aside from
the optional warrant procedure. Members of the Technical Secretariat are not accountable to any American official, they cannot be removed by any American official, and they do not take
orders from any American official.
Such independence is the critical component of the ewe's
innovative multilateral verification regime. The ewe is a watershed in the development of arms control verification methods
because of its attempt to render national governments transparent. Traditional international agreements place obligations
upon the national governments of the state parties, which assume the responsibility for enforcing treaty terms upon their
citizens. The ewe seeks to sidestep national governments by
conducting direct inspections of privately-owned facilities and
sites. Searches by the Technical Secretariat are to take place
without reliance upon the government of a treaty party; a state
party's intervention is required only to assist the inspection
teams in enjoying unfettered access to a facility.
These verification procedures are designed to address the
problem created by national governments that cannot be trusted
39. Section 406(a) requires that the agency working with the Technical Secretariat
seek the consent of the owner or operator of a facility to the inspection. The Section
also states that the agency "may seek" a search warrant from an authorized official, who
presumably will be a federal judge or magistrate. These proceedings, which are ex
parte, require that the agency provide information concerning the basis for selection of
the site for inspection, including evidence and reasons provided by a challenging state.
Section 406(a)(2) requires the authorized official to issue the warrant upon an affidavit
showing that the Convention is in force, that the site is subject to inspection under the
C~mvention, that the procedures of the Convention and of the Act have been complied
wtth, and that the inspection will be conducted in a reasonable manner. H.R. 1590,
105th Cong., 1st Sess § 406(a) - (a)(2).
40. Id. § 401 (d).
41. Id. § 401(e)(2).
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either to conduct meaningful verification themselves or to obey
the treaty's restrictions. The CWC also attempts to build confidence among the signatories by vesting the authority over implementation in a neutral, impartial entity that is not beholden
to any single nation or alliance. 42 Such reassurance through verification helps to alleviate the fears of cheating produced by the
prisoners' dilemma. Although perhaps desirable from a policy
perspective, it is exactly the efforts of this neutral entity to
monitor private parties that produces the constitutional difficulties discussed in the remainder of this Essay. Vesting verification in a neutral, impartial international organization may build
assurance and trust among treaty partners, but it also creates
tensions with fundamental constitutional principles of government accountability.
As will be discussed in the next Section, the Constitution
erects limits on the ability of the federal government to transfer
or delegate power to entities that are not directly responsible to
the American people. Ratification and implementation of the
Convention within the American legal system will require an
understanding of these principles and the development of
mechanisms to respect their requirements.
II

Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Appointments Clause declare that individuals who exercise federal
authority must be appointed as federal officers. Efforts to vest
verification authority in international organizations whose officials are not appointed by constitutional processes and are not
subject to presidential control come into conflict with the
Court's developing principles of government accountability.
This Section will discuss the Supreme Court's approach to the
Appointments Clause, the text and history of the provision, and
the Constitution's structural requirement of government accountability.
Much of the academic writing on the Appointments Clause
has focused on the balance of power struck by the Constitution
when it vested the appointment power in both the President and
the Senate.43 As the Supreme Court recently has recognized,
42. See generally, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Harvard U. Press, 1995).
43. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 Green Bag 2d 253 (1998); John 0.
McGinnis, Essay, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Proc-
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however, the Clause also serves a much broader function than
simply dividing power between the branches. By requiring that
all officers of the United States undergo nomination and confirmation, the Constitution renders all officials who exercise
federal power answerable to the people's elected representatives, and ultimately to the people themselves. If the people
disagree with the manner in which federal officials are enforcing
the law, they can pressure the President and the Congress to
seek their removal and replacement through the appointments
process.
A lHESUPREMECOURr ANDlHEAPPoiNIMENrSOAUSE

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution regulates
the staffing of the federal government and the exercise of certain types of federal authority. According to the Clause, the
President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 44

The Appointments Clause is not just an anachronistic, outdated provision of the eighteenth century. It encompasses two
objectives: to prevent the manipulation of appointments by any
single branch of the national government; and to ensure accountability.45
1. Separation of Powers. The Court identified the Appointments Clause's role in maintaining the separation of powers in Buckley v. Valeo. 46 In part, Buckley raised the question of
the constitutionality of the Federal Elections Commission
(FEC), which was created to administer and enforce the Federal

ess: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 633 (1993); David A.
Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, The Constitution, and the Confirmation Proc·
ess, 101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992); James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the
Senate in Supreme Coun Appointments, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (1989).
44. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl2.
45. See Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752,765 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
46. 424 u.s. 1 (1976).
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Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.47 Congress composed the FEC of eight members, of which two were to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and two by the President. Both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House served ex officio without any right to vote. 48
In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that this arrangement violated the Appointments Clause. Because Commission
members exercised the powers of an officer of the United
States, the Court concluded that they had to undergo nomination by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Even if the members of the Commission were to be considered
"inferior officers," the Court noted, the Constitution still required that their appointment be vested in either the President,
the courts, or a department head. According to the Court, the
framers of the Constitution had specifically divided the appointment power between the President and Senate in order to
prevent the Senate from enjoying the sole authority to appoint
executive branch officials. Describing the Constitutional Convention's decision to amend the Clause into its present form, the
Court stated "that it was a deliberate change made by the framers with the intent to deny Congress any authority itself to appoint those who were 'Officers of the United States. "'49
Relying upon several nineteenth century cases, the Court
grouped all officials of the federal government into three basic
classes. 50 The first group encompasses principal Officers of the
United States, who are nominated by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. A cabinet secretary would be an
example of such an officer. The second category encompasses
inferior Officers of the United States, such as postmasters first
class and clerks of the federal courts. 51 The Buckley Court
47. The composition of the FEC was codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a). After Buckley
invalidated the FEC's makeup, Congress altered the Commission's membership to include the Secretary of the Senate, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives (or
their designees) as ex officio members, and six members appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate with no more than three members from any one
political party. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1988).
48. The presence of the ex officio members was subsequently invalidated as a violation of the separation of powers. Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Opinion of Silberman, J.), cert. granted, 114 S.
Ct. 2703 (1994), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1995).
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129.
50. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1879) ("The Constitution for purposes of appointment ... divides all its officers into two classes.").
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and
Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 225 (1839)).
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placed all other federal employees in yet a third category, labelling them "lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the
United States." 52 This third category would include the secretaries or law clerks of an officer of the United States.
In Morrison v. Olson, 53 the Court provided further guidance
concerning the relationships among these different classes of
federal officials. Although it admitted that the line between a
principal and an inferior officer was unclear, the Court found
several factors that indicated that the independent counsel created by the Ethics in Government Act54 fell into the latter category. The independent counsel was inferior because she was
subject to removal by a higher executive branch official, because
she performed "only certain, limited duties," because her office
was of a limited jurisdiction, and because her office had a limited tenure. 55 Her status as an inferior officer allowed the Court
to uphold the Act's placement of appointment authority over
the independent counsel in a special federal court.
In Buckley and Morrison, the Court emphasized the separation of powers aspects of the Appointments Clause. Both cases
asked whether Congress could transfer appointment authority of
a federal officer from the President and Senate to another
branch of government. In Buckley, the Court rejected Congress's attempt to arrogate appointment authority to itself, while
in Morrison the Court upheld placement of the power to select
an independent counsel in the federal judiciary. The two cases
were different because the Buckley Court approached the Appointments Clause as a deliberate limitation upon Congress, due
to the framers' fears "that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the
other two branches." 56 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Morrison, this threat was not present in the Ethics in Government Act, because Congress had transferred the appointment
power to the Judiciary, rather than to itself. While concluding
that such inter-branch appointments were constitutionally permissible, the Court still found some outer limits on Congress'
ability to transfer power out of the executive branch. In particular, the Court found that Congress could not provide for inter-branch appointments of inferior officers if such appoint52
53.
54.
55.
56.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162.
487 u.s. 654 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 49 et seq.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129.

100

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 15:87

ments either impaired the constitutional functions of another
branch, or reflected an incongruity between the function of the
officer and the function of the appointing branch. 57
In two cases decided last Term, the Court re-emphasized
the Appointments Clause's role in containing congressional encroachment over official appointments. Edmond v. United
State/8 involved a challenge to the composition of the Coast
Guard criminal appeals court. That court contained two civilian
judges who had not received presidential appointment pursuant
to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, but instead were appointed by
the Secretary of Transportation. 59 In deciding that the appointments were proper, the Court observed that the Appointments
Clause "is among the significant structural safeguards of the
constitutional scheme" because it "prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches." 60 The
Framers also designed the Clause in this way, Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court, because they believed that "the President
would be less vulnerable to interest-grouE pressure and personal
favoritism than would a collective body." 1
In Printz v. United States, 62 the Court again stressed the Appointments Clause's function in protecting presidential control
over the execution of the laws by preventing Congress from
transferring such authority to non-federal officers. In invalidating the Brady Act's requirement that state officials conduct
federal handgun background checks, the Court observed that
this commandeering of state officials would violate not just federalism principles, but also the separation of powers. 63 Allocating such federal responsibilities to state governments, the Court
noted, would leave federal law enforcement without
"meaningful Presidential control" and would undermine the effectiveness of a unitary executive. 64 "That unity would be shattered," the Court concluded, "and the power of the President
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring
state officers to execute its laws. "65
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675·76.
117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997).
Id. at 1579.
Id.
ld.
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
ld. at 2378.
Id.
ld.

1998]

CWC AND THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE

101

2. Government Accountability. Buckley contained the seeds
of a broader understanding of the Appointments Clause that
embraces concerns about the general scope of national power
and the manner in which that power may be exercised. Before
the Clause's appointment process may even begin its work, it
first must identify who must undergo such appointment. In addressing this question, the Court has declared that those who
exercise significant government authority must be appointed
pursuant to Article II, Section 2. By requiring appointment of
such individuals, the Court has concluded, the Constitution prevents the national government from blurring the lines of responsibility between the people and their agents. As Chief Justice
Rehn~uist declared for a unanimous Court in Ryder v. United
States : "The [Appointments] Clause is a bulwark against one
branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch,
but it is more: it 'preserves another aspect of the Constitution's
structural inteBrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment power."'
Buckley v. Valeo first articulated this link between the Appointments Clause and the overarching structure of the Constitution. It is possible that the Buckley Court could have declared
that an "Officer of the United States" referred to purely ceremonial titles or only to military and law-enforcement officials,
which would have left the appointment process for most federal
positions up to Congress. In Buckley for example, the government defended the constitutionality of the FEC by arguing that
pursuant to its Necessary and Proper Clause powers, Congress
could establish offices and could fill them in any manner it
chose. In other words, Congress could have designated members of the FEC as non-officers of the United States, thereby
avoiding any Appointments Clause difficulties with the Ethics in
Government Act.
Buckley rejected that alternative interpretation and established a structural analysis of government positions that linked
the Appointments Clause to the legitimate exercise of federal
power. Members of the Commission qualified as Officers, the
Court found, because they enjoyed substantial power under federal law. "We think [the Clause's] fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of
the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' and must,
66.
67.

115 S. Ct. 2031 (1991).
ld. at 2035 (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868,878 (1991)).
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therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by §2, cl. 2, of"
Article 11.68 If Congress attempts to vest federal authority in
someone who is not an officer of the United States, the delegation of authority will be invalid. Non-officers can exercise some
authority, but only if those powers are within the legislative
branch or do not involve enforcement of federallaw. 69
The Court's Appointments Clause analysis thus proceeds in
three steps. First, it asks whether the authority delegated by
Congress involves "the administration and enforcement of the
public law," where that public law is federal law. If so, then it
must determine whether the individual who is given that power
"exercises significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States." If the individual does not exercise significant
authority, then that person is a federal employee and not a federal officer. If the first two conditions are met, the Constitution
requires compliance with the Appointments Clause. Otherwise,
the individual is not an officer of the federal government and his
actions pursuant to federal law are invalid. 70
More recent Supreme Court decisions have further developed Buckley's structural themes. In Freytag v. Commissioner/'
the Court upheld the constitutionality of special trial judges appointed by the chief judge of the Tax Court, an Article I court.
In analyzing an Appointments Clause challenge, the Court
found that the special trial judges were inferior officers due to
their substantial authority to hear certain classes of cases. 72 Because the Tax Court qualified as one of the nation's "Courts of
Law" within the meaning of the Clause, however, the appointment of the trial judges by the chief judge satisfied constitutional requirements. 73 In passing on this issue, the Court linked
the policies behind the Appointments Clause to the ideal of
68. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
69. As the Buckley Court declared:
Congress may undoubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Gause create
"offices" in the generic sense and provide such method of appointment to those
"offices" as it chooses. But Congress' power under that Clause is inevitably
bounded by the express language of Art. II, §2, ct. 2, and unless the method it
provides comports with the latter, the holders of those offices will not be
''Officers of the United States." They may, therefore, properly perform duties
only in aid of those functions that Congress may carry out by itself, or in an
area sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons not "Officers of the
United States."
ld. at 138-39.
70. See Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031 (1995).
71. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
72. Id. at 881-82.
73. Id. at 888-92.
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democratic government. Citing Gordon Wood's book, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, the Court observed that the framers had included the Appointments Clause
in the Constitution to prevent the diversion of power to individuals not accountable to the electorate. According to the
Court, manipulation of official appointments had been one of
the signal grievances against executive power held by the revolutionary generation. "Those who framed our Constitution," the
Freytag majority declared, "addressed these concerns by care74
fully husbanding the appointment power to limit its diffusion."
While the framers divided the appointment power between
the President and the Senate, they did so in order to guarantee
democratic accountability over the process. "The framers understood ... that by limiting the appointment power, they could
ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political
force and the will of the people." 75 Thus, the Constitution's only
exception to this allocation of the appointment power was
granted for inferior officers, the Court observed, and in that case
only if Congress transferred the power to the President, the
heads of departments, or the courts. 76 The Court made the secondary purpose of the Clause quite clear when it declared that
"[t]he structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause
are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire
Republic," and therefore "[n]either Congress nor the Executive
can agree to waive this structural protection. ,n
In two cases involving military courts-martial, the Justices
have reaffirmed the Appointment Clause's purpose in enhancing democratic accountability. In Weiss v. United States,78 the
Court answered the question whether military officers had to receive a second appointment in order to serve as military judges.
Both the parties and the Court agreed that "because of the
authority and responsibilities they possess," military judges "act
as 'officers' of the United States," and therefore had to be appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause. 79 In finding that
a second appointment was unnecessary, the Court determined
that Congress was not attempting either to arrogate appointment power to itself or to transfer authority outside of the po74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

ld. at 883.
Id. at 884.
ld. at 884-85.
ld. at 880.
114 S. Ct. 752 (1994).
ld. at 757.
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litical branches. "[T]here is no ground for suspicion here that
Congress was trying to both create an office and also select a
particular individual to fill the office. Nor has Congress effected
a 'diffusion of the appointment power,' about which this Court
expressed concern in Freytag. " 80
Concurrences by Justices Souter and Scalia in Weiss further
revealed the Court's thinking on this second, "anti-diffusion"
aspect of the Appointments Clause. According to Justice
Souter, two principles lie at the heart of the Appointments
Clause. First, the Clause prohibits any single branch from aggrandizing its appointment authority at the expense of another;
this is the familiar separation of powers theme at work in
Buckley. Second, "no Branch may abdicate its Appointments
Clause duties" by transferring appointment authority to entities
not included in the Clause. 81
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Souter's two-tier analysis
of the Appointments Clause. "Violation of the Appointments
Clause occurs not only when ... Congress may be aggrandizing
itself (by effectively appropriating the appointment power over
the officer exercising the new duties), but also when Congress,
without aggrandizing itself, effectively lodges appointment
power in any person other than those whom the Constitution
specifies." 82 Although Justice Souter has in mind instances when
Congress vests appointment power in a lower-level executive
branch official, Justice Scalia extends the anti-abdication principle to include any situation in which Congress transfers appointment authority to an entity not listed in the Appointments
Clause. In Edmond, Justice Scalia further underscored this purpose when, for the Court, he described the Clause as "designed
to preserve political accountability relative to important gov.
,83
ernment assignments.
Thus, in these recent cases, the Court has reaffirmed the
dual functions of the Appointments Clause first identified in
Buckley v. Valeo. First, the Clause protects the President's control over the execution of the laws, primarily by serving as a barrier to congressional efforts to interfere with the President's selection and management of his subordinates. Second, the
Clause serves an accountability purpose by requiring that any
official who exercises "significant authority on behalf of the
80.

Id. at 759 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883).
Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 766 (Souter, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 770 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83. Edmond v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1573, 1581 (1997).
81.
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United States" must be appointed an Officer of the United
States pursuant to Article II, Section 2. This principle enhances
government accountability by clarifying the lines of responsibility within the federal government, and by holding all officials
who exercise federal power responsible to the people's elected
representatives.
B. THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION AND POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY

To be sure, the Court's elaboration of the purposes of the
Appointments Clause has arisen in cases in which the governmental interests involved might not rise to the level of those at
stake in the foreign affairs context. The Court's case law on the
Appointments Clause, however, deserves to be taken seriously
because it reflects the Constitution's safeguards for representative democracy and government accountability. These fundamental principles require that anyone who exercises the power
of the government ought to be appointed by, and accountable
to, officials who themselves are elected by and responsible to
the American people. Requiring that all individuals who exercise federal power are federal officers is fundamental to the
Constitution's concept of a national government that is not itself
the sovereign, but is only the representative of the people.
1. Background of the Constitution. As the Court has observed, the appointment of government officials was of great
concern to the framers. The history of the Appointments
Clause, however, is more than just a simple story of popular
constraint on executive power. When taken in context, the Appointments Clause can be seen as a reaction against excessive
legislative power as well. 84 Further, the Clause represents a mistrust of all governmental power, and indeed embodies the fundamental relationship between the people and government officials as one between a principal and its agents. This Section will
examine the history of the Clause, and then identify and elaborate upon its popular sovereignty roots. 85
84. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 904 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("The Appointments Clause is, intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation
on Congress.").
85. The legislative history of the Appointments Clause as it relates to the antiabdication principle has not received extensive scholarly treatment in the law reviews.
Two helpful articles are Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Coun, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1079 (1988), and Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37
Syracuse L. Rev. 1037 (1987).
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The revolutionary generation bore substantial suspicion of
the Crown and its exclusive control over appointments. The
eighteenth century English "Whig Science of Politics," as Professor Gordon Wood calls it, laid the seedbed for revolutionary
ideology, which feared that those in power would abuse their
authority to oppress the people and suppress their liberties. 86
The American revolutionaries rejected the concept that sovereignty resided in the King or the government; rather, sovereignty rested in the people themselves, and the Crown and the
executive magistracy existed solely to pursue the public good.
One way in which the Crown improperly had projected its
power over the colonists was by appointing colonial officials,
who were widely viewed as corrupt and oppressive. Recall one
of the complaints of the Declaration of Independence against
King George III: "He has erected a Multitude of new Offices,
and sent hither Swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat
out their Substance." 87
At the ideological heart of the Revolution was the idea of
popular sovereignty. Rejecting the concept that sovereignty was
vested in the Crown or in the government, the revolutionaries
believed that governments "deriv[ed] their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed," and that when a government abused
these powers, "it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government." 88 Although the true sovereign, according to the political theory of the day, had to possess unlimited, indivisible, and final authority, the people could
delegate power to government officials within clearly delineated
boundaries. These officials, however, were not the sovereign
themselves but were only the agents of the people, who possessed the ultimate power in society. 89 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which served as a model for the Federal Constitution of 1787,90 codified this understanding: "All power
86. See generally Wood, Creation at 3-45 (cited in note 11). In fact, some revolutionary thinkers believed that such abuse of power was inevitable because of the tendency in human nature to seek power over others. See Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 55-93 (Belknap Press, 1967).
87. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
88. ld. This separation between the sovereignty of the people and the delegated
power of the rulers is also expressed in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the Constitution, which, as I have argued elsewhere, protect majoritarian rights against an abusive
and oppressive central government. John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 Emory L.J. 967, 970-99 (1993). Cf. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (1987).
89. See Amar, 96 Yale L.J. at 1429-37 (cited in note 11).
90. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167,232-34 (1996).
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residing originally in the people, and being derived from them,
the several magistrates and officers of government vested with
authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are the sub91
stitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them."
The British constitution's allocation of the appointment
power offended popular sovereignty in two ways. First, appointments were made by the King, who was not accountable to
the people. Of course, this problem would not have been cured
by transfer of the appointment power to the Parliament, for the
colonists believed that they also did not enjoy any representation in the imperial legislature. Second, colonial officials appointed by the King were not members of the colonial community, but instead were individuals sent from an almost foreign
land to rule in America. "There is," wrote John Adams in 1776,
"something very unnatural and odious in a Government 1000
Leagues off. An whole Government of our own Choice, managed by Persons whom We love, revere, and can confide in, has
charms in it for which Men will fight. "92
Popular sovereignty demanded that all officials wielding
government power be drawn from the people and that they be
appointed by those accountable to the people. The colonists'
experience with written charters of government already had accustomed them to the idea that government could exercise only
limited powers delegated by the sovereign. 93 Like the corporate
relationship between principal and agent, then, government officials could act only within the prescribed boundaries of the
powers delegated by the people. As Alexander Hamilton wrote
in The Federalist No. 78: "No legislative act therefore contrary
to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm
that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is
above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of
powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but

91. Mass. Declaration of Rights, Art. V (1780).
92. John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 17, 1776, reprinted in Lyman H. Butterfield, ed., 1 Adams Family Correspondence 411 (Belknap Press, 1963), quoted in Wood,
Creation at 78 (cited in note 11). Although subjects of the British empire, the colonists
by 1776 had come to see royal officials as instruments of a foreign government and as
the products of the manipulation of politics and society by the distant, corrupt English
monarchy. Id. at 78-80. On the colonial dissatisfaction with the powers exercised by
royal officials, see Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics 63-91 (Vintage
Books, 1970).
93. Bailyn, Ideological Origins at 175-98 (cited in note 86).
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what they forbid." 94 To make the principal-agent relationship
between the people and federal officials even clearer, Hamilton
concluded: "the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their
agents. "95
Initial efforts to rewrite the state constitutions to incorporate principles of popular sovereignty were unsuccessful. One of
the reactions of the revolutionaries upon breaking with the
Crown was to relocate the power of appointments, with unfortunate results. As part of a general reaction against executive
power,96 early constitution-writers decided to transfer the appointment power from the executive to the state assemblies.
Virginia, for example, in its Constitution of 1776 declared that
the two houses of the state legislature would exercise the power
to appoint all judges and the Attorney General. 97 Pennsylvania
gave the appointment power over all judges and civil and military officers to a twelve-member executive council elected by
the people. 98 These structural experiments proved disastrous.
As Professor Wood has observed, "[t]he appointing authority
which in most [state] constitutions had been granted to the assemblies had become the principal source of division and faction
in the states." 99 To cure this "vice of the system," constitutionwriters in New York and Massachusetts, who rejected legislative
supremacy in favor of a balance with an independent executive,
returned the appointment power to the state Governors, with
the participation of a council of state. 100 These reforms, particularly the strengthening of the executive at the expense of the
94. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 524 (Wesleyan
U. Press, 1961).

95. Id at 525. In Federalist No. 39, James Madison also defined a republican form
of government to be "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices
during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior." The Federalist at 251
(cited in note 94). One characteristic of such government, Madison further observed, is
"that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people."
96. See, e.g., Yoo, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 222-28 (cited in note 90) (describing structural
changes in executive's ability to make war); Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 271 (Rita and Robert Kimber trans., U. of North Carolina Press, 1980).
97. Virginia Constitution (1776), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, ed., 7 The Federal
and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 3816 (Govt. Print
Office, 1909).
98. Pennsylvania Constitution§ 19-20 (1776), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 Federal and
State Constitutions at 3086-87 (cited in note 97).
99. Wood, creation at 407 (cited in note 11).
100. Id. at 433-34.
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legislature, had a powerful influence on the delegates to the
Philadelphia constitutional convention. 101
2. The Constitutional Convention and Ratification. In devising a new Constitution, the Philadelphia delegates confronted
the task of developing an appointments system that effectuated
popular sovereignty without duplicating the failures of the state
constitutions. Delegates rejected early proposals, such as the
Virginia Plan, that sought to vest the appointment power in the
national legislature. 102 James Madison's effort to locate the
authority in the Senate met with early support, 103 but in the end a
shared arrangement between the President and the Senate
(proposed by Alexander Hamilton) prevailed. 104 Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts hit upon the "Advice and Consent"
language, which ultimately was adopted-along with the idea of
presidential nomination accompanied by senatorial confirmation- in the waning days of the Convention. 105
Delegates approved today's Appointments Clause in order
to enhance government accountability. Placing the appointment
power in the President alone was thought to risk tyranny, while
vesting it solely in the legislature, it was feared, would "give full
play to intrigue & cabal." 106 As James Wilson put it, "intrigue,
partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences"
of "appointments by numerous bodies." 107 The text of the provision attempts to address these dual concerns not only by placing
the power to nominate solely in the hands of the President, but
also by allowing an appointment to be completed only with
senatorial confirmation. As Governeur Morris declared during
the Philadelphia Convention, "as the President was to nominate,
there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur,
there would be security." ~
1

101. Yoo, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 229-30 (cited in note 90); see also Charles Coleman
Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789 at 34-38 (Johns Hopkins Press, 1922);
Federalist 26 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 167 (cited in note 94).
102. Max Farrand, ed., 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 119-47
(Yale U. Press, 1937). For more detailed descriptions of the history of the Appointments Clause, see Gauch, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 341-58 (cited in note 43); Blumoff, 37
Syracuse L. Rev. at 1061-70 (cited in note 94).
103. Farrand, 1 Records at 120 (cited in note 102).
104. Id. at 128.
105. 2 id. at 38, 44, 495, 539.
106. 3 id. at 42. See also 1 id. at 119, 120 (statements of James Wilson and James
Madison).
107. 1 id. at 119.
108. 2 id. at 539.
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Debate over the Appointments Clause during ratification
clarified the framers' intent to create a system that enhanced
public accountability over the exercise of federal power. AntiFederalists criticized the proposed arrangement because it gave
the Senate too much executive authority, which they believed
would undermine the separation of powers. 109 Alexander Hamilton responded in the Federalist Papers by emphasizing that the
location of the appointment power in the presidency would
promote openness and responsibility in the filling of national offices. Because a nomination would be submitted to the Senate,
"the circumstances attending an appointment, from the mode of
conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety; and
the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been
performed by the different actors. " 110 If, for example, a poor
nominee was sent forward, then "the blame ... would fall upon
the president singly and absolutely." 111 If, on the other hand, the
Senate were to reject a fit candidate, "[t]he censure ... would lie
entirely at the door of the senate." 112 If an unsuitable nominee
were to be appointed, then both branches would suffer at the
hands of the public. "If an ill appointment should be made the
executive for nominating and the senate for approving would
participate though in different degrees in the opprobrium and
disgrace. " 113 Hamilton specifically contrasted the benefits of the
Constitution with the secrecy that attended the appointment
process in New York state, in which "an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open," and "all idea of responsibility is
lost. " 114
To be sure, the Appointments Clause serves a checks-andbalances function by dividing the appointment power between
two branches of the national government. This was the focus of
The Federalist No. 76, which was the companion piece to The
Federalist No. 77. This purpose, however, should not obscure
the provision's equally important goal of constraining the actions of the national government as a whole. As Publius' comments in No. 77 suggest, the Appointments Clause seeks to
109. See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, Pennsylvania Packet
(Philadelphia), Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1 The Debate on the
Constitution 546-47 (Library of America, 1993). See also Jack N. Rakove, Original
Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 270-75 (Knopf, 1996).
110. Federalist 77 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 517 (cited in note 94).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 518.
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make public the process of appointment in order to bring responsibility and accountability to the operations of the federal
government. By opening appointments to public scrutiny, the
Constitution ensures that those who are to exercise federal
power-the agents of the people-will be carefully evaluated,
and that any officers who abuse their powers will be held responsible. This meaning becomes even clearer when one considers that the next paper in the series, Federalist No. 78, discusses judicial review as an additional method for ensuring that
"the intention of the geople" is "to be preferred" to "the intention of their agents." 1 Both the Appointments Clause and judicial review work together to ensure that the federal government
does not seek to aggrandize its powers or conceal their improper
use.
3. Other Constitutional Structures that Promote Government
Accountability. Two other structural provisions promote the
Appointments Clause's goal of advancing government accountability. First, the Constitution creates a unitary executive
branch that demands that all federal officials remain subject to
the control of the President, who along with the Vice-President
is the only nationally-elected member of the government. Efforts to delegate federal power outside the executive branch
may violate not just the Appointments Clause, but also Article
Il's vesting of the executive power in the President alone. 116
Second, the Constitution nowhere provides for the delegation of
public authority outside of the national government. Most of
the scholarship and judicial decisions concerning the nondelegation doctrine concern the standards that must accompany
the transfer of authority to executive branch agencies. Nondelegation principles, however, may also be offended by the
transfer of authority completely outside the government without
any standards at all.
American constitutional scholars have been conducting a
vigorous debate concerning the nature of the presidency and of
the unitary executive. 117 One side advances a "formalist" ap115. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 525 (cited in note 94). For a discussion of the original understanding of the purpose of judicial review as checking federal usurpations of power at the expense of the states, see generally John C. Yoo, The
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (1997).
116. Printz v. United Stares, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
117. See, e.g., MartinS. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725
(1996); Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
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proach that emphasizes that the Constitution creates three
branches-executive, legislative, and judicial-which are to exercise independently the three distinct powers-again executive,
legislative, and judicial- that lie within their domains.
"Functionalists" reject a rigid tripartite structure in favor of a
more flexible approach. They provide substantial discretion to
the political branches to arrange and share government powers,
so long as they do not violate clear textual allocations of power
and function to the different branches. 118
An effort to transfer power outside of the federal government would raise constitutional difficulties under either the
formalist or functionalist models. A formalist would argue that
the administration of federal law, such as enforcing treaty obligations or conducting criminal investigations, is an executive
power that must be exercised by the President or those responsible to him. Any delegation of law enforcement authority to an
individual who is not a member of the executive branch and who
is not removable by the President, therefore, violates the separation of powers. 119 The Court applied this mode of reasoning to
find that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law
was unconstitutional, because it vested an executive power-the
authority to identify required spending reductions-in the
Comptroller General, who was found to be controlled by Congress because he was removable by joint resolution. 120 As with
the Appointments Clause, the purpose behind centralizing all
law enforcement in the President is to render those who exercise
government authority accountable to the public, which can hold

118. This division in the scholarly community has mirrored the Supreme Court's
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory approach to the separation of powers. For
example, in cases such as INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986), the Court invalidated the legislative veto and the automatic recission
device of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law because they unconstitutionally vested executive functions outside the executive branch. In cases such as Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988) and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), however, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel and of the Sentencing Guidelines commission in the face of formalist attacks. Although it may be futile to predict
these matters, formalism seems to be on the rebound, as demonstrated in Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252 (1991) and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, lnc.,ll5 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
119. See, e.g., Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L.J. at 593-99 (cited in note 117); see
also Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1166 (1992); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalist Perspective on Why the Court was Wrong, 38 Am. U. L. Rev.
313, 353-54 (1989).
120. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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the President responsible for his or her actions through the elec121
toral and political process.
A functionalist approach might yield a similar result. In the
122
leading functionalist case, Morrison v. Olson, the Court upheld
the establishment, within the Justice Department, of an independent counsel who could not be removed by the President except "for good cause." The Court emphasized that the removal
restriction was constitutional because it did not "impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty" to exercise
the executive power and to see that the laws are "faithfully executed. " 123 The President continued to enjoy the power to control
and supervise the independent counsel, the Court found, because as an executive officer the independent counsel still remained subject to removal. "This is not a case in which the
power to remove an executive official has been completely
stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the
124
BePresident to ensure the 'faithful execution' of the laws."
cause of this removal authority, even if diluted, the President
still "retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is com125
petently performing her statutory responsibilities."
Morrison v. Olson assumes that the separation of powers
would not permit the complete insulation of an officer exercising executive authority from presidential removal. Otherwise,
the President would be deprived of his ability to control the
members of the executive branch and to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. 126 Furthermore, observing that law enforcement is a core executive function, the Morrison Court found that
the President's supervision and control over all law enforcement
officers had to be maintained in order for the separation of
powers to be respected. 127 To be sure, functionalists are willing
to accept a dilution of the presidency's removal authority in order to promote other valuable government interests. Even aca121. On this point, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Founh Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 597 (1984); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. a. Rev. 41; Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The
Independent Counsel Mess, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, The
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
122. 487 u.s. 654 (1988).
123. Id. at 691-92.
124. ld. at 692.
125. ld.
126. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations
of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 62, 7475 (1990).
127. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696.
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demic supporters of the functionalist approach, however, likely
would object to the complete delegation of authority outside the
executive branch, because it would upset the values of balance
between the branches, of government accountability, and of
government efficiency that they believe the separation of powers promotes. 128
Indeed, both formalist and functionalist theories would be
offended by a transfer of power outside the government because
of their shared interest in enhancing accountability in government. Accountability is advanced by the participation (either
alone or joint) of the Congress and the President-the two
branches that are chosen by the electorate-in the formulation
and the implementation of federal policy. Policy is made either
by the Congress, which is subject to bicameralism and presentment, or by the President, who is the representative of the national polity-especially in the age of the "plebiscitary presidency."129
Each branch monitors the other, and, where
necessary, checks the other's power through the use of the veto,
the purse, or oversight. When the branches conflict with each
other, the public remains informed about the government's operations and about whom to hold accountable. These benefits of
public lawmaking are lost if authority is vested outside the federal government to individuals who are not responsible to the
electorate.
A second constitutional principle that reinforces the Appointments Clause is the non-delegation doctrine. The Supreme
Court has held that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows
Congress to delegate portions of its enumerated powers to the
executive branch. 130 Such delegations often take the form of
administrative action or rulemaking in areas in which Congress
has provided only general principles. Congress may not delegate such authority, however, unless it has stated an objective,
prescribed methods to achieve the objective, and articulated intelligible standards to guide administrative discretion. 131 These
requirements attempt to guarantee, at least in a loose sense, that
courts will be able to evaluate whether the power is being exercised within the limits of the delegation. Such standards prevent
Congress from wholly abdicating its constitutional responsibility
128. Flaherty, 105 Yale L.J. at 1777-ffl (cited in note 117).
129. See Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Cornell U. Press, 1985).
130. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
131. Mistretta v. United Stares, 488 U.S. 361,371-75 (1988).
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to formulate policy and ensure that Congress will remain responsible to the electorate for its policy choices. Although the
Court has not invalidated a congressional delegation of authority since the New Deal, the Justices continue to observe that
Congress cannot transfer legislative authority without some
meaningful standards. 132
Such concerns are exacerbated when Congress attempts to
delegate authority to individuals or entities that lie outside the
national government. Congress cannot enforce its standards
through the usual legal or political methods when the recipient
of the delegated power is not responsible to Congress, the President, or any other federal authority. Neither Congress nor the
public has ready means of monitoring the performance of nongovernmental individuals or of measuring their conduct against
intelligible standards. Delegation to private parties undermines
the public-regarding nature of federal power and risks the capture of government policy by private interests. Fearing this result, the Court in 1935 and 1936 struck down statutes that attempted to give the force of law to regulatory codes and
standards promulgated by industry and labor groups. 133 As the
Court stated, since "one person may not be entrusted with the
power to re§ulate the business of another, and especially of a
competitor," 34 such delegation "is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties
of Congress." 135
Like the Appointments Clause, the non-delegation doctrine
furthers dual objectives. First, the doctrine ensures that the executive branch will not enjoy complete discretion in the exercise
of delegated power. This also prevents Congress from sidestepping the checks on its own lawmaking power by transferring it
completely to the President. Second, the non-delegation doctrine enhances accountability in public policymaking by opening
up the lawmaking process to public review. By requiring bicameralism and presentment of all laws, the Constitution creates
132. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-75.
133. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
134. Carter, 298 U.S. at 311.
135. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 537. Although on only a sporadic basis,
the Court has maintained its suspicion of such delegation. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
the Justices invalidated a Massachusetts law that gave a church a veto over liquor licenses for establishments located within 500 feet of the church. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). As
one observer has commented, "(t]he judicial hostility to private lawmaking ... thus represents a persistent theme in American constitutional law." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 369 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988).
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"institutional inertia" against the initial formulation of policy,
which is overcome only by substantial political effort, which itself draws public attention. 136 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in
The Federalist No. 73 in defending the presidential veto: "The
oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the
diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less
must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due
deliberation, or of those misteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest. " 137
Efforts to transfer federal authority to an entity outside the
federal government undermine the principles of the unitary executive, of the non-delegation doctrine, and of the public accountability they both seek to promote. If the American people
disagree with the manner in which such federal power is exercised, they have no political avenue to influence the individuals
who wield that power. This Section has sought to demonstrate
that the Appointments Clause requires that individuals who exercise substantial federal authority must undergo appointment
pursuant to the Clause. This conclusion is supported both by
the Court's decisions interpreting the Clause and by the principles of public accountability and democratic self-government
that form the Constitution's structure. Requiring that all who
act under color of federal law undergo appointment renders
them subject to the control of national officials who ultimately
are elected by the people. This ensures that the people will have
a voice in the administration of federal law by influencing the
selection and removal of their agents.
III

The Constitution's principle of government accountability,
and its expression in the Supreme Court's modern reading of the
Appointments Clause, create significant difficulties for the implementation of the CWC. Simply put, the CWC requires the
vesting of federal power in officials who are not responsible to
the American government. The case of the CWC, however, also
highlights ambiguities in the Court's interpretation of the Appointments Clause and in the scope of the government accountability principle. This tension between the Appointments
Clause and the demands of international multilateral agree136. Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 Va.
L. Rev. 1, 25-29 (1982).
137. Federalist 73 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 495 (cited in note 94).
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ments must be resolved if the nation is to pursue further its efforts to integrate itself into supranational organizations.
A. APPLICATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE TO THE

ewe

If the Court were to apply its Appointments Clause test as
it has in its recent cases to the ewe, the treaty appears to be
constitutionally suspect. First, the CWC grants the power to
search American facilities and sites to officials of an international organization who are not appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, who are not members of the executive
branch, and who are not accountable to the President. Second,
the treaty grants the authority to select the locations to be inspected to the Technical Secretariat. Their decisions neither are
made by officers of the United States subject to standards established by federal law, nor are they reviewable by an American official appointed by, and accountable to, the President. In
other words, the ewe establishes an entity that exercises public
authority upon American citizens without the constitutional
safeguards designed to preserve government accountability.
To determine whether the CWC inspection teams are subject to the Appointments Clause, we must examine whether they
exercise significant federal authority. Upon first glance, it appears that the members of the Technical Secretariat and its inspection teams are exercising some type of federal power. The
inspection teams enter the facilities and sites in question and
conduct searches. Although American officials may accompany
the inspection teams, it is clearly the team members who decide
what is to be examined, who walk through a facility and examine
its contents, who review documents, who interview facility personnel, and who run tests. Federal law forbids facility operators
and private citizens from interfering with the freedom of access
of these inspectors; indeed, the targets of the search are required
by law to provide their full cooperation. In the domestic context, it is federal law that gives federal law enforcement officials
the authority to enter private property to conduct searches. 138
Here, it is also federal law-specifically the CWC and its implementing legislation- that grants a similar authority to the
Technical Secretariat's inspection teams. Furthermore, the
138. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (authorizing "officer" to enter premises if refused
entry in order to execute search warrant). It should be noted that § 3109 is limited to
entries by officers of the government.
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CWC's implementing legislation imposes criminal and civil penalties for violations of the Convention that are discovered by the
inspection teams.
In addition to its function as the inspector, the Technical
Secretariat also enjoys the authority to choose the locations to
be searched. Under the treaty and the implementing legislation,
the Technical Secretariat may select any search target without
the possibility of review by an American official. Neither the
ewe nor the implementing legislation contain any legallyenforceable criteria that can guide or contain the discretion of
the Technical Secretariat. The Secretariat need not explain its
reasons for demanding a search nor must it evaluate whether
some level of probable cause exists to justify an inspection. In
fact, some of the searches are to be conducted at random; these
searches by their very nature will not be undertaken on the basis
of any level of probable cause or articulated suspicion of wrongdoing. No American agency can review or block the Secretariat's decision to search a location within the United States' jurisdiction.
We can see the significance of the authority involved in selecting locations by contrasting the freedom of the Technical
Secretariat with the constraints placed upon similar decisions
made by domestic law enforcement. Although domestic law enforcement agencies also enjoy the power to conduct searches,
this power is subject to three discrete checks. First, the Constitution itself requires that the searches be reasonable, and generally that they be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with garticularity the places, persons, and things to be
searched. 1 Second, subject to certain exceptions, the law enforcement agency cannot conduct the search until it receives the
warrant from a judicial officer, who has the authority to review
the facts and showings of probable cause de novo and to refuse
to issue a warrant. 1 Third, even if a warrant has been issued
and a search conducted, courts may choose to suppress the evidence Rroduced if they find that the search was unconstitutional.1
These multiple constraints on the authority of domestic law
enforcement to conduct searches reflect the Constitution's con-i()

139. U.S. Const., Amend IV.
140. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
141. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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cern with the power of the national government in the law enforcement area. Furthermore, the political process imposes an
ultimate check upon the ability of law enforcement to conduct
searches of private homes and businesses. If the electorate disapproves of the manner in which prosecutors or police are conducting searches, it can remove them (if elected) or the elected
representatives who supervise them. The people also can bring
these abuses to the attention of Congress, which could hold
oversight hearings and use its appropriations power to terminate
funding for abusive searches. 142 The Political Safeguards protect
not just federalism, but the separation of powers and individual
. hts as we 11143
ng
.
Vesting authority to conduct searches in an international
organization may evade this fundamental political check on domestic law enforcement. Members of the Technical Secretariat
cannot be held accountable by members of the United States
government or by the American electorate. If the Technical
Secretariat were to abuse the inspection process, the American
public would be unable to exert any control over the officials
who are exercising that power. The President has no authority
to remove members of the Secretariat, federal law forbids interference with the inspection teams, and Congress cannot use its
funding power to curb the Secretariat's activities. This result
undermines the basic purposes of the Appointments Clause, as
identified by the Supreme Court in Weiss: to guarantee that the
people have a voice in the appointment of those officials who
wield federal powers, and to allow the public to hold its elected
representatives accountable for "an ill appointment." 144
142. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A
Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 281-313 (U. Chicago Press,
1980) (describing methods available to Congress to check executive branch).
143. I am not arguing, however, that these political safeguards are exclusive. Instead, as I argue elsewhere, the political process should serve as a primary obstacle to
unconstitutional government action, to be supplemented by judicial review. See Yoo, 70
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (cited in note 115).
144. Federalist 77 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 517 (cited in note 94).
In fact, some of the concerns raised by critics of the CWC, such as the theft of trade
secrets in violation of the Fifth Amendment or the violation of the rights of privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment, see Rotunda, 15 Const. Comm. at 149-59 (cited in
note 6), stem from the failure to observe the principle of government accountability.
For example, the Takings Clause guarantees that if the government takes property, it
must pay just compensation-a rule that applies to intellectual property as well as to real
property. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232 (1986); Ruckelhaus
v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). If international inspectors, however, steal
confidential business information, aggrieved American parties will be unable to seek a
monetary remedy .because members of the Technical Secretariat are not considered to
be officials of the federal government. Such inspectors would not be liable under either
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B. WHO IS SUBJECf TO THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE

This analysis is subject to two criticisms of the Court's approach to the Appointments Clause, one focusing on who is an
appointee and the other on the nature of significant federal
power. First, one might argue that the Court has applied its test
only in situations when the individual involved was already an
official of the federal government. Under this interpretation,
the only question in the Court's cases was whether the official
had to undergo appointment pursuant to Article II, Section 2, or
whether he or she could exercise federal authority without an
appointment of constitutional dimension. 145 Delegations of
authority to non-federal actors, therefore, do not implicate the
Appointments Clause because these individuals are not already
members of the federal government.
This theory, however, makes little sense of the Court's
cases concerning the Appointments Clause and the executive
power. It would allow Congress and the federal government to
escape the requirements of the Clause simply by vesting authority in private individuals, rather than in appointees who are already members of the federal government. Furthermore, it
would allow Congress to fragment the authority of the unitary
Presidency by transferring power to individuals beyond the control of the executive branch. For example, Buckley v. Valeo 146
apparently could have been avoided if Congress only had vested
the Federal Election Commission's authority in private individuals, such as members of Common Cause, rather than in officers of Congress. Or, to take another example, Bowsher v. Sy-

the Federal Tort Claims Act, which applies only to employees of the federal government, Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (defining "federal agency" and
"employee of the government" for purposes of tort liability), or under state common
law, because of their international immunity under the ewe. The exclusionary rule
would prove of little use if the plaintiff was never brought up on criminal charges. This
result, in fact, may be a good reason to replace the exclusionary rule with a damages action for Fourth Amendment violations in this context. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.757, 811-16 (1994). It is even uncertain if
evidence provided by non-governmental actors in this context could be suppressed. See,
e.g., United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search
and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §1.8(g) at 213-19 (West, 2d ed. 1987)
(discussing if Fourth Amendment applies to searches by foreign police).
145. This was the argument raised by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in response to claims that the ewe presented Appointments Gause problems. Constitutional Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the
Committee on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 104-859, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 81-95 (1996).
146. 424 u.s. 1 (1976).
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nar141 would have been unnecessary if only Congress had thought
of vesting the authority to identify automatic spending cuts in
the Brookings Institution, rather than in the Comptroller General.148 Military court-martials would not be subject to constitutional challenges if Congress only had given the authority to
conduct court-martials to the American Bar Association, rather
than to civilian employees of the federal government. Under
the Court's reasoning, vesting such power in private individuals
completely outside of the control of the executive branch and of
the national government would create even more severe constitutional difficulties than those that actually occurred in these
cases. 149
A critic of the Court's Appointments Clause jurisprudence,
however, might respond by pointing to the example of state enforcement of federal law. Almost from the beginning of the Republic, the federal government has turned to the states for assistance in the implementation of federal programs and in the
enforcement of federal criminallaw. 150 If these state governors
and officials are not appointed as officers of the United States,
147. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
148. See Krent, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 79 (cited in note 126).
149. In defending the constitutionality of the CWC, the Justice Department produced a memo that attempted to narrow the natural interpretation of Buckley and its
progeny. Hearings on the Constitutional Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention at 82-94 (cited in note 145). The Clinton administration argued that the Appointments Clause does not apply to an individual unless that person already occupies a
position of employment within the federal government. Contrary to Buckley, the administration believes that the Appointments Clause analysis ought to be decoupled from
the question of what authority is vested in the official. For support, OLC resuscitated
three cases: United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15.747);
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879), and Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310
(1890).
These cases provide little support for the administration's interpretation. First, they
only discuss the difference between officers of the United States on the one hand, and
employees of the United States on the other, rather than the question of whether appointment must accompany the delegation of federal power. Second, none of these
cases involved situations in which a federal statute delegated substantial authority and
discretion to the official in question. It is quite clear that the individuals in Germaine
and Auftmordt were acting in only a ministerial or advisory capacity, and that they exercised no independent authority or discretion under federal law. In this respect, contrary
to the views of the OLC memo, Germaine and Auffmordt are quite consistent with the
reading of Buckley advanced by this paper. Indeed, United States v. Maurice, which was
decided by Chief Justice John Marshall while sitting as a circuit judge, supports the principle articulated by Buckley. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. at 1214 ("If, then, the agent of fortifications be an officer of the United States, in the sense in which that term is used in the
constitution, his office ought to be established by law, and cannot be considered as having been established by the acts empowering the president, generally, to cause fortifications to be constructed.").
150. Krent, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 80-84 (cited in note 126) (surveying various congressional statutes and practices).
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and their enforcement of federal law is not unconstitutional,
then it must be possible to delegate federal authority outside of
both the executive branch and the national government. 151 Some
supporters of a functionalist approach to the separation of powers have relied upon this line of reasoning to argue that the
President need not have complete authority over the execution
of all federal law. 152 If, for example, the President cannot remove state governors or supervise their enforcement of federal
law, then the Constitution does not require that the President
possess similar power over everyone who exercises federal
authority.
It should be noted at the outset that delegating federal
authority to state officials does not raise the same accountability
concerns involved with the CWC. State officials are still responsible to the people of a state; indeed, because of their closer
proximity to the electorate, state officials may be even more responsive to their constituents than federal officials. 153 In the context of joint federal-state programs, delegating authority to state
governors actually may buttress the purposes of the Appointments Clause, because it provides the people with two sets of
representatives to hold responsible. So long as the federal government is not "commandeering" state officials and is not hiding
its own responsibility for certain decisions, 154 state and federal
cooperation may have the effect of enhancing democratic selfgovernment, rather than, as in the case of transferring federal
power to non-governmental officials, undermining it.
State officials, moreover, may not even implicate the Appointments Clause because they may not be "exercising signifi155
cant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."
State governors exercise authority pursuant to their own office
as state officials rather than pursuant to any federal office. Federal law may not add to their powers in any way; their actions
only have the result of achieving federal policy goals, but may
not depend on federal law for their legal force. For example,
151. See, e.g., Memorandum for the General Counsels of the Federal Government
from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, Re: The Constitutional Separation
of Powers between the President and Congress (May 7, 1996) (on file with author).
152. See, e.g., Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 19, 31, 69 (cited in note 117).
153. See, e.g., Yoo, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (cited in note 115); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1493-1500
(1987); David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 58-106 (Northwestern U. Press, 1995).
154. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
u.s. 144 (1992).
155. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
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when a state law enforcement officer enters a residence to conduct a search for illegal drugs, he must rely upon the powers
granted to him by the state for the authority to enter the residence, even if he happens to discover evidence that is later used
in a federal prosecution. Otherwise, Congress could grant
authority to any individual, even a private citizens, to conduct
searches and investigations even though he is not accountable to
156
the President or any other elected official.
C. SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL AUTHORITY
A more difficult problem is presented in determining when
an exercise of federal power implicates the Appointments
Clause. The Court's case law suggests that every exercise of
federal power must be undertaken by a federal official, and
when that power is substantial, it must be undertaken by an official who has received appointment pursuant to Article II, Section 2. This approach, however, provides insufficient guidance
in the face of the complex nature and forms of federal power
that exist today. Extending the Court's approach to the Appointments Clause to harder cases may suggest ways in which
the ewe might be implemented consistent with constitutional
requirements.
First, every action and decision taken by individuals involved with the federal government need not constitute the exercise of significant federal authority. Members of government
advisory commissions or task forces, for example, do not appear
to exercise federal authority sufficient to require appointment as
Officers of the United States, even though their recommendations might exert a significant influence on federal policy. 157 Ac156. This appears to be the reasoning underlying the Court's discussion of the appointment power in Printz v. United States, 117 S. a. 2365 (1997). In that case, the
Court concluded that Congress could not force state executives to enforce federal law
because, in part, to do so would place federal law enforcement outside the control of the
President. As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court: "The insistence of the Framers upon
unity in the Federal Executive-to insure both vigor and accountability-is well known.
That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply
requiring state officers to execute its laws." ld. at 2378 (citations and footnote omitted).
The Court appeared to believe that state officials might be able to enforce federal law
voluntarily, but that Congress could not actually vest authority in state officials to do so
because of the threat to executive power. Id. at 2378 n.12. If that is the case, then the
authority of state executives must derive from their own office, rather than from any
power to exercise federal authority.
157. See, e.g., Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997
F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing whether First Lady and health care task force were
federal officers or employees subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
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tions by federal employees also do not involve substantial exercises of federal power because they are acting under the direction and supervision of an appointed officer; otherwise, by definition, they would require appointment as federal officers.
Moreover, not every action by a proprietary government entity,
such as Amtrak, necessarily qualifies as the exercise of significant federal authority, although its conduct is governed by the
Bill of Rights and its directors are federal appointees. 158
Second, every exercise of federal power may not demand
the involvement of a federal official. Our legal system, for example, sometimes tolerates the activity of private parties who,
through their private actions, advance federal interests. For example, when private plaintiffs enforce their rights under federal
law in a federal court, the government can be said to have vested
some amount of power in private parties. We might even characterize their actions as enforcing the public interest or the public policy of the United States. Nonetheless, we would not think
of private plaintiffs as exercising such significant authority under
the laws of the United States that they would qualify as Officers
of the United States. Instead, we consider the plaintiffs as acting on their own accord as private citizens, even though they exercise the discretion of whether to bring suit and how to conduct
the litigation. 159
This issue also arises when non-federal actors conduct
searches and provide evidence that is used in a subsequent federal prosecution. In Burdeau v. McDowell, for example, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment restricts only government searches and not searches conducted by private parties. 160
Although a number of exceptions exist to the rule, such as joint
searches involving police participation,161 Burdeau permits pri158. See, e.g., Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)
(Amtrak subject to the First Amendment). Six of Amtrak's eight directors are appointed by the President, with four of them receiving the advice and consent of the Senate. In concluding that Amtrak should be subject to constitutional restrictions, the
Court observed that Amtrak "is not merely in the temporary control of the Government
(as a private corporation whose stock comes into federal ownership might be); it is established and organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing federal governmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal governmental appointees." Id. at 398.
159. But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of raciallyrestrictive covenants under state common law constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment).
160. 256 u.s. 465 (1921).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Andrini, 685 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1982); Corngold v.
United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure at §1.8(b) at 17892 (cited in note 144) (discussing and collecting cases).
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vate parties to provide evidence to federal prosecutors
(although state officials may not do so free from the constraints
of the Fourth Amendment). 162 Thus, searches by common carriers, such as airlines or package services, do not constitute the
exercise of government authority, because they are private parties relying upon their common law rights to inspect passengers
or goods that they transport. 163 Similarly, searches by public
utilities to monitor the condition of equipment do not constitute
government action, because the inspections are undertaken pursuant to common law or contractual rights. 164 Finally, courts
have held that evidence supplied by foreign police produced by
searches on foreign soil do not fall within Fourth Amendment
restraints, unless American officials participate in the search. 165
These cases at the outer edges of federal authority provide
examples of the arguable exercise of governmental power that
do not appear to rise to the level where they must be carried out
by Officers of the United States. For purposes of this paper, the
question remains whether the powers and activities of the
CWC's Technical Secretariat are more similar to these examples
than to those addressed by the Court in Buckley and its progeny.
Two factors emerge when we attempt to account for these situations within the framework established by the Court's Appointments Clause case law, which may suggest ways to harmonize
the CWC's implementation with the Constitution's principle of
government accountability. First, we can draw a distinction between situations in which an entity has been given authority, under federal law, to affect the rights of third parties, and those in
which it has not.
For example, a federal advisory committee or task force
generally neither acts upon the constitutional rights and duties
of private parties nor has the power to force private parties to
obey their commands. Here, federal law requires private persons to allow the ewe inspection teams onto their property, re162. The Court abolished the so-called "silver platter" doctrine in 1960. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (exclusionary rule includes evidence supplied by state
search which, if conducted by federal officials, would violate Fourth Amendment).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974). If common carriers are acting pursuant to government orders, however, then they may be considered to be government actors. See,
e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
164. Perez v. Autoridad de Energia E/ectrica de Pueno Rico, 741 F. Supp. 23 (D.
Puerto Rico 1990).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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quires cooperation with the search, and forbids interference with
their movements and activities. In this respect, members of the
Technical Secretariat wield power on a par with that enjoyed by
federal law enforcement officers. Unlike the example of utilities
or common carriers, the inspection teams' authority to search
does not derive from any common law or contractual rights that
arise because of a service that they provide to facility owners.
Instead, the Technical Secretariat enjoys authority that Congress has delegated to it by legislation- in other words, they are
acting under color of federal law. 166 Limiting the reach of the
Appointments Clause in this way-by applying it only to officials who are vested with discretionary authority to affect the legal rights and duties of private parties-is consistent with the
Court's case law and helps explain examples that do not appear
to require the involvement of a federal officer.
Congress could pull the ewe away from the reach of the
Appointments Clause by abandoning the decision to vest inspection teams with the official authority to conduct searches under
color of federal law. Instead, the ewe implementing legislation
could attempt to alter the common law rights of property owners such that they could not exercise their power of exclusion
upon the inspection teams. While such an action might lie
within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, the redistribution of property rights on such a broad scale might present substantial Takings Clause problems. Alternatively, Congress could create a cause of action that would allow the
Technical Secretariat to sue for the right to enter property because of the harm posed by the suspected presence of chemical
weapons. This scheme, however, would deny the speed and secrecy demanded by the ewe verification mechanism. A better
approach would require the Secretariat to enter into voluntary
agreements with every facility that falls within the ewe inspection categories, in order to gain their consent to a search. Relying upon direct CWC-facility agreements might solve the Appointments Clause problem, because the authority for a search
would derive from a contract rather than from federal law. This
alternative, however, might present difficulties for the execution
of challenge searches, which by their nature might include nonconsenting facilities.
166. a. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (finding no state action in decision by school, funded almost exclusively by the state, because of absence of delegated
state authority).
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Second, we might explain the Appointments Clause's
"significant federal authority" prong as extending only to situations involving a core government function. In other words, the
Clause could be read to require appointment when a federal official is exercising his or her authority in an area that is considered to be a central government activity, but not when an official is engaged in an activity that falls outside our conception of
such functions. Thus, the federal government's supervision of
Amtrak may not implicate the Appointments Clause, because
operating a railroad may not lie at the core of a government
function, but rather constitutes the participation of government
in a proprietary activity. To be sure, as the Court has suggested
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,167 it is difficult
to draw an exact line between "traditional" government functions and propriety functions. Nonetheless, the Court in more
recent cases has displayed a willingness to identify areas of government authority at the state level so significant that they must
remain free from federal control. 168 Printz v. United States might
be read, for example, as assuming that law enforcement is such a
core government function that the federal government cannot
commandeer a state's police force for federal purposes. Delegating the authority to enter and search private property for
purposes of discovering violations of the criminal laws may represent a similar intrusion into a core government function.
At a minimum, government functions that only federal officers may perform ought to include areas of authority that the
Constitution allocates to the executive branch. Enforcing this
principle would address the Court's concern in its Appointments
Clause cases about congressional efforts to strip power from the
unitary executive, and it would satisfy the Constitution's requirement of government accountability. Thus, the power to
engage in military hostilities must rest solely in the federal government's hands, both by virtue of the President's Article II,
Section 2 Commander-in-Chief power and by the Article I, Section 10 bar on state war-making. 169 Similarly, the federal government could not delegate the authority to negotiate treaties or
to appoint judges to private persons, although certainly the
167. 469 u.s. 528, 543-46 (1985).
168. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Printz v. United States, 117 S. a. 2365 (1997); see also
Yoo, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (cited in note 115).
169. See Yoo, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 252-56 (cited in note 90).
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President could seek advice on such matters from nongovernmental entities or individuals. 170
These considerations indicate that the ewe implicates the
executive branch's control over the government function of law
enforcement. As the Court observed in Morrison v. Olson, control over federal law enforcement and prosecution is linked to
the President's executive power and his obligation to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." Because prosecution and
law enforcement have been functions typically and historically
undertaken by the executive branch, Congress could impose
only a limited good cause restriction on the President's freedom
to remove the independent prosecutor. 111 In its state action
cases, the Court also has recognized that law enforcement is a
government function that cannot be delegated to private individuals free of the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment.m
The Technical Secretariat's statutory authority to enter and
search the premises of American facilities in search of breaches
of the ewe, for which criminal sanctions would attach, appears
to be the functional equivalent of the power of federal officers
who have the responsibility to investigate violations of federal
law.
A description of the problem suggest a possible cure. If the
core government function here centers on law enforcement and
prosecution, then the ewe may be harmonized with the Constitution by detaching its searches from the coercive power of the
state. First, implementing legislation could place more reliance
for the legal authority for a ewe inspection upon the consent of
a facility owner, rather than upon a statutory requirement that
all owners must permit members of the Technical Secretariat
upon their property. Second, the Technical Secretariat still
might be permitted to search under color of federal law, but
only if any incriminating evidence found could not be used in a
prosecution against the facility owner. Such evidence could be
170. Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440
(1989).
171. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) ("There is no real dispute that the
functions performed by the independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they
are law enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within
the Executive Branch."). But see Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 Yale L.J. 1069 (1990).
172 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See also Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on
State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 Wash.
u. L.Q. 757.
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used, of course, to demonstrate a breach of U.S. treaty obligations under the ewe, but allowing the Technical Secretariat to
supply evidence, obtained on American soil under color of federal law, to prosecute an American citizen, would represent the
performance of a public function allocated solely to the federal
government. 173 De-coupling the verification purpose of ewe
inspections for international treaty purposes from the purpose
of achieving domestic law enforcement and prosecution objectives, therefore, could alleviate the objection to the Convention
raised by the Court's Appointments Clause doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has sought to analyze a potential stumbling
block of constitutional proportions to the multilateral verification mechanism of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has
described the Supreme Court's growing jurisprudence in the
Appointments Clause area, and it has linked the doctrine to the
principles of government accountability that inform the constitutional design. Reconciling the constitutional requirement of
government accountability with the demands of multilateral
treaty obligations will require the adjustment of either the
Court's approach to the Appointments Clause or the implementation of the Convention.
How the problem addressed in this paper is resolved will
have a significant impact on the nation's ability to conduct its
foreign policy in the future. The CWC's reliance upon an international organization, rather than on state parties, to conduct
verification will serve as a model for future multilateral agreements. It is probable that future multilateral arms control
agreements will contain similar provisions for intrusive on-site
verification by international inspectors. 174 Such verification
mechanisms are likely to spread beyond the arms control area to
other international regulatory treaties, particularly those con-

173. Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1%0) (abolishing "silver platter" doctrine that allowed federal courts to receive evidence from state law enforcement officials
obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment standards); United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d
1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (permitting introduction in federal court of evidence obtained by
foreign police on foreign soil pursuant to foreign authorization); LaFave, 1 Search and
Seizure at §1.8(g) at 213-19 (cited in note 144) (discussing cases).
174. Efforts to renegotiate the Biological Weapons Convention have included calls
for such verification mechanisms. Chayes and Chayes, New Sovereignty at 179 (cited in
note 42).
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cerning the environment. 175 As with the CWC, the objective is to
ensure compliance not just by national governments, but also by
private parties within the state. As Abram and Antonia Chayes
have observed, while "[s]uch treaties are formally among states,
and the obligations are cast as state obligations ... [t]he real
object of the treaty . . . is not to affect state behavior but to
regulate the activities of individuals and private entities." 176 The
future also may bring on-site verification mechanisms in the
context of international labor standards and of human rights, or
any other area in which an international agreement seeks to
regulate private activity. As the United States decides whether
to further this process, it will need to address how the Constitution will allow it to accept the international commitments of a
new multilateral world.

175. If, for example, nations wish to reduce the emission of a certain substance, an
international organization might be created to monitor whether industrial facilities and
businesses are violating specified limits on the production and use of that substance.
Both the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which seeks
to phase-out the use of CFCs, and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, which imposes limits on the emission of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide,
fit within the model of international regulatory agreements that seek to monitor the use
of certain substances by domestic industries. See, e.g., David D. Caron, Protection of the
Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of International Environmental Law, 14
Hastings Inti. and Comp. L Rev. 755 (1991) (describing verification regime for Montreal Protocol). One can view the verification procedures of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the Antarctic Treaty as further steps toward the
use of intrusive on-site inspections in the context of international regulatory agreements.
On the regulation of whaling, see Patricia Birnie, ed., International Regulation of
Whaling: From Conservation of Whaling to Conservation of Whales and Regulation of
Whale Watching (Oceana Publications, 1985). For recent developments, see David D.
Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal
Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 Am. J. Inti.
L. 154 (1995). On Antarctica, see Christopher C Joyner and Sudhir K. Chopra, eds.,
The Antarctic Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988).
176. Chayes and Chayes, New Sovereignty at 14 (cited in note 42).

